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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
Aristotle reminds us that the human being is not only a rational animal, but also a 
story-telling animal. And those stories (represented through the dramas of the 
Poetics) must have a certain structure and an internal logic, following by means of 
what is necessary or probable. Narratives that violate such principles, that are 
improbable or otherwise “irrational;” will not have the appropriate effect on an 
audience. Audiences will not learn from them (always a concern in Aristotle’s 
practical works), and they certainly will not be persuaded by them. 
 This plea for narrative probability is reinforced by Paula Olmos’ scholarly 
journey, tracing the tensions between narration and argumentation, from the early 
place of narratio in the parts of speeches to the parallels with the informal logician’s 
treatment of explanation, and current debates over fiction versus non-fiction. Along 
the way she highlights the importance of the pragmatic context, which leads her to 
reject the fiction/non-fiction distinction and establishes the need for an 
argumentative theory of narrative probabilitas that serves the demands of modern 
theories of argumentation. There is much to explore in her detailed analysis; I will 
focus on just a few points related to the veracity of factual discourse and the 
plausibility of narratives. 
 
2.  CONCEPTS OF NARRATION 
 
The early accounts of the narratio are understood in terms of a setting out of the 
facts. This certainly differs from the fictive telling of a story that tries to draw an 
audience in through some lesson learned or an illustrated claim. Each of these very 
different uses of narration, though, indicates the kinds of barriers that have been 
erected by argumentation theorists to prevent the treatment of narratives as 
arguments or at least to police the situation with strict conditions that would have 
to be met before the narrative qualifies.  Essentially, these conditions reduce to 
demands that narratives fit the structure of arguments in order to qualify. That is, 
they must have a claim and supporting premises. This fits the definition provided by 
Kvernbekk, for example, in her paper “Narratives as informal arguments” (2003) 
and what Govier and Ayers (2012) describe as the “core” of an argument. Of course, 
in identifying a core, they also suggest that there are non-core elements, and this 
they provide in a footnote: emotional indicators, counter-considerations, and also 
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jokes or illustrative anecdotes (2012, p. 166n.9). In fact, a fuller exploration of that 
footnote, were we to have time for it, might well find a case for the narrative in the 
argument. But as long as the core criterion dominates in accounts such as those of 
Kvernbekk and Govier & Ayers, then the analyst can demand of the text, ‘what are 
the premises?’, and in the absence of a suitable response, reject the candidate. In a 
sense, the problem is similar to the treatment of images as arguments. The 
difference, of course, lies in the discourse-basis of the narrative and the different 
genres involved. But this just serves to identify the frustration experienced when 
trying to account for narratives in terms of the genre of argumentation. Because if 
we do identify the premises and the claim they support, then we have indeed an 
argument. But what is left of the narrative? It has been absorbed in the argument 
(one genre consumed by the other.) Or, more to the point, what is left that is of 
importance for the narrative to contribute in evaluating the strength of the 
discourse? What much of this suggests is that whether narratives can work as 
arguments will depend very much on how we construe ‘argument’. 
 In this light, the observed parallels with the treatment of explanations are 
indeed useful. Informal logicians do evaluate these pragmatically, in terms of the 
end that a discourse attempts to achieve.1 Like arguments, explanations offer 
reasons, and so a better appreciation of the “space of reasons” may reveal the ways 
in which statements operate as reasons in relation to an end at which a speaker or 
writer aims. This may not tell us what kinds of reasons narrative statements 
provide, but at least the parallel serves not to dismiss narratives out of hand. 
 Likewise, the ideas drawn from Agricola are particularly useful insofar as he 
is the source of a compelling account of how plausible expositions with persuasive 
ends fit into the wider scope of argumentative discourse (rather than the restrictive 
structures of informal arguments). This points to a common persuasive end for a 
range of discourse types—arguments, explanations, narratives—and ways in which 
they are unified by that end. In a sense, this suggests that the attempt to see 
narratives as arguments (as if arguments occupied a higher position on a hierarchy, 
and other discourse types aspired to reach such heights) is mistaken. Instead, both 
arguments and narratives (and explanations, and images) can operate 
argumentatively insofar as they aim to persuade. (There may be other aims, but we 
can restrict our attention to one for the present.) What matters, then, is the 
probabilitas, credibility or plausibility involved. 
 
3. FACTS AND THE PLAUSIBILITY OF NARRATIVES 
 
It is interesting to read of Zabarella’s dismissal of History because it conveys “the 
mere narration of facts” (p. 9). I think Olmos captures well what is wrong with such 
an interpretation, although it is worth emphasizing. Indeed, if the narration of facts 
is just an objective description about a state of affairs with which no one might 
disagree, then it would be hard to read such descriptions as in any way 
argumentative. But it is exactly when we are given competing descriptions (when 
                                                        
1 Kvernbekk (2003) briefly discusses the status of narratives as explanations (p. 10). 
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we choose one newspaper over its competitor) that we expect a case to be conveyed 
through the narration of events. In argumentation theory we no longer think that 
“the facts speak for themselves,” as old funding grants used to suggest. The facts 
have no voice; it is the writer or speaker who gives them voice, and in so doing that 
writer or speaker takes a stand on the facts.  
 From the perspective of rhetorical argumentation, what is at stake relates to 
the choices involved: how will the “facts” of a case be presented? Which point should 
be stated first, and how will their order and arrangement effect their reception? A 
similar idea is now captured in the extended version of pragma-dialectics, with the 
introduction of rhetoric through strategic maneuvering. The arguer makes key 
selections about the topic from those available, including which of the available 
information will be included. Whenever “facts” are conveyed in a narrative, then, we 
look for the choices that have been made (of inclusion and exclusion) because those 
choices, and hence the narration that is constructed, are argumentative. This is, I 
believe, the point Olmos has in mind when she writes: “if the pragmatic criterion 
applies and these narratives are discursive means to make us decide about facts 
under discussion, their believability would be put forward just in order to defend 
their being good (the best available) portraits of reality” (p. 10). We might only 
consider adding two provisos to this: that the “if” is unnecessary, since the 
pragmatic criterion should always apply (there will always be rhetorical choices 
involved); and, secondly, even where the intention that is hinted at here is not 
conscious in the writer or speaker, we are still being given an interpretation of the 
facts. The very act of giving voice to facts in a narrative is an act of interpretation. 
 My second more general comment relates to the nature of plausibility, or 
credibility, to the narrative probabilitas that is being advocated and developed in the 
paper. Again, we are clearly operating in the rhetorical dimension, because 
plausibility is an audience concern. We might imagine a general sense of what is 
plausible, in the abstract, but the idea operates more coherently in smaller 
communities. Narration is, after all, a way of personalizing argumentation, creating a 
sense of communion between arguer and audience.  
 Yet still the concept of ‘plausibility’ must be given some content, and this is 
attempted in the paper. Various ideas contribute to the profile: “Believability” (the 
central element); “consistent with phenomena” and “free from contradiction” (these 
from Agricola); “characteristics which are accustomed to appear in real life” (from 
Cicero); the internal coherence of the events, and the external coherence with 
shared assumptions about behaviour (from Plumer); and some mix of veracity and 
verisimilitude issues from Olmos’ disagreement with Plumer. From such a set of 
non-exhaustive ideas we could then determine ways to evaluate narratives, beyond 
their “logic.”2 
 What seems most advocated here, in the paper in question, is the plausibility 
of narratives judged as “coherent wholes.” Now, such coherence can be internal or 
external, or both, and I suspect it is the dual aspect that is important. But the same 
                                                        
2 Walter Fisher offers similar ideas in his narrative paradigm, (which is both argumentative and 
literary, 1987, p. 58) with his specific notions of narrative rationality (p. 66) and, most importantly, 
fidelity (p. 105ff.).  
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kind of ideas are not common to both types of coherence. Internally, we can accept 
very different worlds if the ideas are consistent and non-contradictory, and 
explained in terms of themselves. Externally, we move centrally to the audience that 
judges, and here the narrative must fit their expectations of the world, their 
understanding of what can and cannot happen, what makes sense. But here the 
account needs to find ways to accommodate a clearly argumentative type of 
narrative popular with philosophers—the thought experiment or hypothetical case. 
I have in mind here someone like Judith Jarvis Thomson (1971) and her story of the 
hooked-up violinist (“It sounds plausible. But now let me ask you to imagine this. 
You wake up in the morning and find yourself back to back in bed with an 
unconscious violinist. A famous unconscious violinist” p. 48). The conceit requires 
the reader to put herself in a situation which is not plausible, and see what follows 
logically from there. It has internal coherence, but it does not fit with what we know 
about the external. And, yet, Thomson expects a conclusion to be drawn about the 
“real” world. Or more radically, there is Derek Parfit’s (1984) ‘teletransporter’ 
narrative, right out of an episode of Star Trek, by which he expects his audience to 
be persuaded about his account of personhood. (“I enter the Teletransporter. I have 
been to Mars before, but only by the old method…When I press the button, I shall 
lose consciousness, and then wake up at what seems a moment later” p. 191.) This 
kind of narration, with its clear argumentative intention, is a challenge for the 
plausibility account. 
 So perhaps the criteria are loose and apply differently to different kinds of 
narrative. Or perhaps narrative draws most of its argumentative power from its 
contributory nature, being given in addition to an argument (like Protagoras in the 
dialogue named after him, presenting his case first as a Great Myth, and then as a 
logical argument). What matters is that narratives not be included from having an 
important role in argumentation, broadly conceived, and that papers such as this 
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